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 1 Introduction 
This paper is organized around the results of a research project on ‘Participation, elections and 
social stability in rural and urban areas in China’ which was jointly conducted by Gunter 
Schubert (University of Tuebingen) and the author. Whereas Schubert focused on rural areas, 
the author concentrated on urban locations. Three surveys were conducted altogether (based 
on interviews with ordinary residents and local officials): the first in spring 2003 in two 
neighbourhoods in Shenyang, followed by two neighbourhoods in Chongqing in summer 
2003, and finally two neighbourhoods in Shenzhen in spring 2004 (see Appendix for further 
information). 
 
One intention of the research project was to examine the political awareness of urban 
citizens and officials in terms of participation and elections. The pivotal question was how 
institutional change is reflected in the minds of the people concerned. Not only in the view of 
the political leadership but also of many social scientists, village and more recently urban 
elections are crucial for the political reform agenda and for a ‘socialism with Chinese 
characteristics’. Are we right in the assumption that this ‘local democracy’ prescribed from 
above will eventually transcend the institutional restrictions set up by the authorities? Will it 
dynamically reinforce tendencies of social and political pluralization which have evolved 
during the reform process? 
 
As far as the effects of elections are concerned, new institutionalism has focused on 
political contest for some time. What this perspective has neglected, however, was the effects 
of elections on the people concerned. 1  Therefore, from the perspective of new 
institutionalism, we are concerned with the question of the manner in which the 
reorganization of urban residential areas could serve to modify the institutional setting and 
thus contribute to regime legitimacy. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine both elections and electoral processes. We will 
begin with the reorganization of urban residential areas where new communities are created. 
Similar to rural areas, elections have also been introduced in urban neighbourhoods. In this 
paper we are concerned with the attitudes of ordinary residents and local officials regarding 
elections. Our basic argument is that although elections have some mobilizing and 
participatory effects, they are currently not of primary concern for the citizens themselves, but 
rather constitute a secondary phenomenon. For the ‘better-off’ strata, individual autonomy is 
of greater importance; for the socially weak strata, it is the search for social security that is 
crucial. Finally, we will show that elections nevertheless have a mobilizing effect which 
strengthens people’s sense of efficacy. 
 
 
2 The reorganization of urban residential areas and the emerging of the Shequ 
 
From the 1950s onward, the organization of the party-state was extended to urban residential 
areas. ‘Residents Committees’ (RC) were established across the country as leading 
organizational bodies. Until the late 1990s, the members of those committees consisted 
primarily of elderly women (housewives and pensioners) with lower educational levels. Their 
principal function was to ensure social control of and in their neighbourhoods. 
 
Economic reforms, economic and social change, and, strongly interrelated, growing social 
mobility significantly altered the structure of urban residential areas. Traditional communities 
as, for instance, the danweis eroded. Increasingly, homogeneous residential areas based on an 
                                                          
1 Cox 1987 and 1990; Knight and Sened 1995: 1. 
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affiliation to a state-owned economic or administrative unit (like an enterprise) experienced a 
gradual disintegration. The social structure of those areas was further modified by the decline 
of previously privileged groups (e.g. urban skilled workers), the rise of new elites (private 
entrepreneurs, professionals, new middle classes), and a growing floating population. Local 
authorities were faced with increases in unemployment and urban poverty, as well as the 
erosion of family structures and public security. The traditional RCs, with their poor 
reputation, were no longer able to meet the new demands placed by these problems. 
 
Nowadays, many neighbourhoods consist of subdivisions within which members of still 
existing or former danweis live. The structure of the neighbourhoods has changed through the 
purchase or sale of real estate, or as some inhabitants moved. Businessmen, craftsmen, and 
entrepreneurs from rural areas rented or purchased flats. Hence, the neighbourhoods are now 
composed of rather different social strata and former danwei members now live concurrently 
alongside members of the local political and economic elite, some of whom have purchased 
new condominiums in these areas. 
 
This was the background for the reorganization of urban residential areas initiated by the 
central leadership at the end of the 90s. Several neighbourhoods under the jurisdiction of RCs 
were merged into larger ‘communities’ (Shequs) or neighbourhoods. A Shequ is characterized 
as a geographically separate residential area. With this move, it was intention of the political 
leadership that neighbourhood residents develop a shared identification based on common 
interests and needs. It was further hoped that they would voluntarily participate in the 
implementation of those interests and needs, thus creating a co-operative relationship of 
solidarity among each other. 
 
The term neighbourhood implies a twofold meaning: (a) a spatial one, in the sense of an 
administrative sub-unit (at the level of self-administration beneath the ‘Street Offices’), with a 
population between 3,000 and 16,000 inhabitants; (b) a normative or functional one, i.e. a 
classification in terms of a segment of population characterized by spatial proximity, shared 
interests and social control. 
 
The size of an RC depends on the number of inhabitants in a neighbourhood. The RCs we 
investigated were composed of six to nine members. According to legal regulations, members 
are elected by inhabitants by means of either direct or indirect elections. Diagram 1 illustrates 
the organizational structure on the example of Shenyang: 
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Diagram 1: Organizational structure of Shequ in Shenyang (2003) 
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Below the RC we find people responsible for individual tasks as well as issue-oriented 
associations. In some neighbourhoods, the number of those associations is considerably large. 
Yet, as a rule, they were not established by inhabitants but rather initiated in a top-down 
manner. 
 
In principle, the Organizational Law of Urban Residents Committees from 1989 designated 
two major tasks to those committees: a) to support the government in preserving social 
stability and b) to provide the inhabitants with social services and social security benefits. 
Yet, on the local level, we find differing perceptions of what the pivotal tasks of a Shequ are, 
ranging from the simple tasks of administration and control to social welfare, birth planning, 
creating new job opportunities, improving hygienic conditions, organizing leisure activities, 
cultivating social discipline, and expanding the participation and self-administration of the 
residents. 
 
Currently, the RCs are less concerned with self-administration, but rather with activities 
which used to be the tasks of the state, such as birth control, paying out pensions, reviewing 
prerequisites for income support to families with no or low income (dibao), mediating 
conflicts among residents, handling divorce applications, coordinating the care of sick 
persons, handicapped people, drug addicts and persons with a previous conviction, and 
providing psychological advice (e.g. after family violence or attempted suicide). The RCs are 
continually entrusted with new tasks, including keeping personal files or supervision of 
persons under probation.2 
 
The committees are overloaded with work and poorly backed financially. In 2003/04, the 
urban districts provided merely a few hundred yuan per month for operating costs (400 yuan 
per capita for the RC in Shenzhen).3 In contrast, the Street Offices (sub-district level) were 
housed in modern, multi-story buildings with well-equipped offices; some of them with little 
factual work to accomplish. Given this situation, it could be argued that the state has 
transferred cost-intensive and particularly conflictive domains directly to the neighbourhoods. 
 
                                                          
2 Cf Renmin Ribao, September 5 and 15, 2003. 
3 Interview, Civil Affairs Bureau Shenzhen 4 March 2004. 
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3 Elections as political phenomena 
 
Political science comprehends elections as a democratic method of selecting officials on the 
one hand, and as a technical procedure on the other. Functionally, elections are considered an 
opportunity of citizens to influence the choice of their political leaders and, furthermore, to 
shape the political system. Additionally, elections may reinforce both the political legitimacy 
of a system and the trust held in its efficiency.4 
 
Elections are not necessarily a democratic act. Even during the most radical periods of the 
Mao era, candidates nominated by the Party for various positions were elected in those days 
by voting, in this case by the public raising of hands. We must, therefore, distinguish between 
different types of elections, all the more as the significance of elections, their contents and 
goals, all depend on a given political system. Political science distinguishes between 
competitive, semi-competitive and non-competitive elections. The various classifications are 
related to the degree of contest between candidates, and general and secret ballots. Elections 
characterized by contest, secret ballots, and choices of candidates’ selection can be classified 
as competitive elections; if the freedom of elections is restricted, they are semi-competitive; if 
there is no liberty at all, we can speak of non-competitive elections.5 
 
There has been some progress in enforcing elections in recent years, particularly through 
the spread of the system of village and town or township elections. Meanwhile, village 
leadership must be elected by the population via direct, secret ballots. On the levels of 
towns/townships and urban neighbourhoods, experiments have been made with the direct 
election of local officials. The success of rural elections reinforced the endeavour of the 
transfer of rural experiences to urban areas. The Ministry of Civil Affairs, responsible for 
grassroots elections, argues that elections should strengthen the degree of the population’s 
participation, as well as the legitimacy of the political system. Nonetheless, significant 
differences between rural and urban areas make a transfer of direct elections to urban 
neighbourhoods difficult. The following differences between rural and urban areas can be 
discerned: 
 
• In rural areas, village elections often began as bottom-up processes, i.e. they were initiated 
by villagers, whereas urban elections had a top-down character, i.e. initiated by higher 
authorities. In contrast to the work of the urban RCs, the work of the rural Village 
Administration Committees has a direct effect on the villagers’ living standard. Every 
village, for instance, owns land, which is periodically distributed among the villagers. 
Villages possess, furthermore, village-owned enterprises and an accumulation fund paid 
into by the villagers. Therefore, the interest in participating in structuring the village 
economy or the use of the accumulation fund is much greater. As a contrast, urban 
neighbourhoods, as a rule, do not possess such a collective economy. 
• The RC activities in urban areas do not spawn collective income. The neighbourhoods are 
more concerned with the organization of daily life and providing services for residents. 
Yet, it is the state, and not the residents themselves, which organizes and funds the urban 
entities. 
• As far as issues such as income, living space, employment or the the environment are 
concerned, villagers are able to exert more influence on political decision-making than 
urban dwellers. 
                                                          
4 See, for instance, Banducci and Karp 2003. 
5 Cf Nohlen 2000: 21ff. 
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• The village as a natural unit could be classified as a ‘place of neighbourhood’; the urban 
Shequ, in turn, as a ‘place of friendship’. 6  Urban relations do not rest upon natural 
neighbourhood relations as in villages, but rather transcend the residential area. 
 
 
As far as elections are concerned, Chen and Zhong argue that both persons with a stronger 
democratic orientation and those with a critical attitude towards the political system would 
participate to a lesser degree in elections than those with a certain proximity to the political 
system. The latter would elect in accordance with their loyalties. From this perspective, non-
voting is a mode of political protest.7 Furthermore, they argue, the Party was less interested in 
democratic competition, but instead in preserving its legitimacy and improving the capacity 
and efficiency of governance. The authors contradict Shi Tianjian’s findings based on a 
survey in Beijing, which conclude that people attended elections so as to pursue own interests 
and not out of identification with the system. People were more interested in penalizing 
corrupt officials than in enforcing democratic values.8 
 
Although both Chen/Zhong and Shi Tianjian examined elections of People’s Congress 
deputies, our own results, verify, in large part, the results of the former. Our interviews reveal 
that people who do not significantly identify with the system have only a minor interest in 
elections. This tendency is strengthened in cases where elections are not yet direct but 
indirect, horizontally (by the Party committee of the neighbourhood) or vertically controlled 
(by the Party committee of the street), and the majority of candidates are Party members. On 
the other hand, Shequ officials who back the interests of the residents enjoy a higher standing 
among their constituency. Such a standing, in turn, has an impact upon the turnout of the 
elections. Thus, the voting act serves as a mode of legitimizing or confirming the respective 
officials and thus may legitimize the political system as well. Our interviews reveal that at 
least a part of the interviewees link the engagement of officials to the electoral process, albeit 
such a relationship is not easy to determine. The option to select among competing candidates 
is a basic prerequisite that enables a political choice between different candidates to be made. 
This, the formalization of electoral procedures, and the voting act itself have an impact on the 
election delegates. Delegates understand that elections are connected to the responsibility of 
the elected towards the residents and also between the election process and the obligations of 
the elected towards the constituency. Accordingly, voting has an effect on the awareness of 
the constituency. 
 
 
4 Three types of urban elections 
 
Urban residents are involved in three voting acts: (a) election of the deputies of the district’s 
People’s Congress; (b) electing the members of the RC, and (c) electing the members of the 
Home-Owners Self-Organization Committee (HOSOC). 
 
Voting act (a) consists of direct elections, i.e. every 18-year-old resident is obliged to 
attend the elections. In the case of absence, voters may ask other persons to vote on their 
behalf. Although our survey did not focus on these elections, our interviews revealed that the 
majority of interviewees considered them to be important. However, about 10 percent of the 
interviewees had difficulties in distinguishing which elections (of People’s Congress deputies 
                                                          
6 Vobruba 1994: 25. 
7 Chen and Zhong 2002: 1ff. 
8 Shi Tianjian 1999. 
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or of RC members) they had attended. And about 15 percent (21 interviewees) complained 
that they did not know the candidates and their interest in voting had therefore been modest. 
 
As far as voting act (b) is concerned, two main types of RC elections in urban 
neighbourhoods can be found: voting on the part of residential delegates is the predominant 
form (indirect voting), and in a minority of Shequs all residents are entitled to vote. 9 
According to the political leadership, in the near future direct voting will be implemented 
throughout the country (on direct voting see section 5).10 
 
Elections of the HOSOC (c) can be considered a form of direct elections. The housing 
reform during the 1990s led to both a conversion of living spaces into condominiums, which 
were then sold to residents, and to the construction of new commercial housing sold on the 
market. Companies responsible for administration and maintenance of new commercial 
housing areas (property management companies, wuye gongsi) were established. Yet, frequent 
tensions have arisen between house owners and these companies in terms of payment of fees, 
repair and maintenance issues. As organizations representing the interests of the new 
proprietors did not exist, independent interest organizations of the owners emerged in the 
1990s. Their boards (the HOSOCs) are elected by all owners and are accountable to them. 
Even though the local authorities do occasionally intervene in the daily activities of those 
committees – for instance if a board proves to be too radical or conflictual – the residents 
perceive these organizations as being democratically elected and legitimized institutions. 
They differ from the RC in their character as bottom-up organizations and representation of 
the constituents’ interests. Therefore, property owners demonstrated more interest in electing 
those organizations than in electing the members of the RCs.11 
 
In the neighbourhoods investigated in Chongqing and Shenyang, HOSOCs had not yet 
been established. In Shenzhen, in turn, board elections occupied a much more prominent 
position than that of the RCs. 
 
Interviewees who had experiences with HOSOCs assessed the work of these organizations 
as follows: 
 
 
Table 1: Assessment of the Work of Home-Owners Self-Organization Committees 
(Shenzhen only) 
Represents the interests of owners   
Directly elected     
We deal with problems once they arise  
Self-elected (without outside interference)  
Is a genuinely autonomous organ   
Too many internal struggles    
Poorly working     
15 
8 
8 
7 
6 
3 
1 
 
Source: Own survey. 
Note: Covering persons taking part in a committee’s activities. 
 
                                                          
9 So, for instance, in Yingchou County in Guangxi, see Li and Chen 2002: 325–6; in detail: Li Fan 2002: 338–
47. On neighbourhood elections cf Wang Bangzuo 2003. 
10 See, for instance, Renmin Ribao 31 March 2003. 
11 On the history and current situation of Home-Owners Self-Organization Committees, see Read 2003. 
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Most owners classified the HOSOCs as ‘autonomous’ i.e. as organs elected by the residents 
themselves. Elections were considered to be direct and free. In contrast to RC elections, most 
owners were informed about the elections of their HOSOCs. Mostly people with prestige and 
a certain influence, such as Party or trade union chairmen of larger enterprises or lawyers, 
took over the position of chairmen of HOSOCs. 
 
The relationships between RCs and HOSOCs are, to a certain extent, conflict-laden. In 
Shenzhen’s Huaxiajie neighbourhood, a HOSOC sued the local RC for damages, as the latter 
had used some vacant space under the first floor of the buildings not only for the 
establishment its own offices, but also as rental space for commercial businesses. The 
HOSOC, in turn, argued that those areas belonged to the ownership community and could not 
be arbitrarily utilized by the RC. The latter lost the lawsuit and had to pay 1.7 million yuan in 
compensation to the ownership community. But the HOSOC fell short of its original intent, 
which was to drive the RC out of the Shequ area. 
 
Once HOSOCs act too autonomously, higher authorities may intervene. Shenzhen 
authorities had already taken measures in order to minimize the competition between RCs and 
HOSOCs and to integrate the latter in a corporatist manner. Though, until 2004, HOSOCs 
could still act as real autonomous interest bodies, elected directly and in a democratic way, the 
Shenzhen authorities decided that they had to act under the leadership of the respective RCs in 
the future in order to minimize cleavages. 
 
 8
5 Elections in the Shequs investigated 
 
The first elections of RCs were conducted in Shenyang’s Shenhe district in June 1999.12 
Meanwhile, elections can be found in almost all cities. RCs are predominantly elected 
indirectly by representative assemblies consisting of representatives of households, houses or 
blocks. The first direct elections to include all residents were conducted in Nanning, the 
capital of the Guangxi Autonomous Region in 2001.13 There is no prevailing model for 
standard elections. Even in Shenyang, a model city for urban elections, the coexistence of 
various forms can be observed.  
 
In the Shequs that we investigated, only indirect elections existed. The RCs were elected 
by the Shequ’s Assembly of Representatives, i.e. by delegates and not by all residents. As a 
rule, the Assembly of Representatives consisted of the heads of the inhabitant groups or the 
leaders of houses or blocks, together with the representatives of work units (danwei) located 
in a neighbourhood. The house or block leaders are also responsible for the election of house 
or block representatives who shall attend the election act. 
 
Representatives Assemblies in Shenyang and Chongqing had between 50 and 125 
members, varying in accordance with the size of the neighbourhoods; more than 80 percent 
were women. According to the Street Office, the representatives were elected by the 
respective households. Our interviews revealed, however, that the RCs designated specific 
persons to act as ‘voter representatives’ through a series of initial consultations. Leaders of the 
houses went from household to household, polling the opinions of the residents. Such 
inquiries had a more informal character. People were asked, for instance, about their opinion 
in relation to particular voter delegates or RC candidates and often responded ‘that will be 
fine’ or ‘We will leave the decision up to you’. 
 
The Assembly of Representatives (the electors) in Shenyang’s Yongfeng neighbourhood, 
for example, had 132 members (of a total population of 6,000). 18 of them were house or 
block leaders and 55 were heads of ‘Responsibility areas of Party members’; others were 
representatives of various Danweis. ‘Responsibility areas of Party members’ referred to Party 
members who were charged with the task of mobilizing votes in distinct sections of a 
neighbourhood. Furthermore, ‘outstanding persons’, some of them Party members, some not, 
were appointed as voting delegates. The appointment was decided by the RC. 
 
RC members are elected for three years. The Assembly of Representatives gathers once a 
year in order to discuss and formally approve the working report of the RC. 
 
Positions for RC candidates are publicly announced. Applicants may sign up to attend the 
nomination examination. The examination consists of a written and an oral part and 
encompasses issues of legal regulations (regarding neighbourhoods), the organization of 
neighbourhoods and questions of general political and social concern. The Street Office 
decides on the candidate list and on the positions of the RC’s leadership functions. It also 
ensures that the candidates are qualified and capable of acquiring public trust and reputation. 
 
Party membership is not a prerequisite for becoming an RC chair person; nonetheless, 
loyalty towards Party and government is expected by the higher authorities. Based solely on 
their legal status, RC members are not representatives of the government; nevertheless, they 
are responsible for the propagation and implementation of state policies. This requires persons 
                                                          
12 On details of electoral processes: Li Fan 2002: 272–3. 
13 Compare the numerous depictions of election processes in Li Fan 2002: 275ff. and Deng Minjie 2002: 225ff. 
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who are able to gain the trust of the residents and engage themselves and others in support of 
residents’ interests. Thus, the work of the RCs contributes to reinforcing the legitimacy of the 
political system. 
 
The nomination list of the candidates is made public. The block leaders contact the 
households concerned and ask the residents about their opinions on the candidates. 
Nomination meetings are held in the form of a gathering of the Assembly of Representatives, 
where the candidates have the opportunity to introduce themselves and to put forth 
statements. The final nomination list is determined by consultation, not by voting. The list 
usually contains one person more than the number of candidates which will be elected. In the 
final act of this election process, the representatives vote separately on the ordinary members 
and the leading RC body (head, vice-head). Only one candidate is nominated respectively for 
leading positions. 
 
Thus, RC members are elected by a voting process and must be re-elected after a period of 
three years. If they do a bad job, they are usually not successful in this endeavour. Therefore, 
even indirect elections have an impact upon the political behaviour of RC members. 
 
In the 2002 elections, in all of the Shequs we investigated in Shenyang and Chongqing, 
five out of six candidates were elected as RC members. In the Fuhua Shequ in Shenzhen, 
eight out of ten candidates were elected.14  
 
In recent years, the requirements for candidates have been raised significantly. In 
Shenyang and Chongqing, a college or university degree was a standard requirement, and the 
age of candidates was limited to 45 years for leaders and 50 years for ordinary members. Only 
in Shenzhen was there no restriction in age and an upper middle school educational level 
appeared to be sufficient. 
 
In Chongqing’s Jiangbei district in 2003, 43 percent of the RC members had a college or 
university degree, the average age was 37 years, but merely 29 percent were Party members.15 
In Shenyang, according to official data, 40.6 percent of the RC cadres had a college or 
university degree, with an average age of 42; 44.9 percent were laid-off workers (xia gang) 
and 38.1 percent Party members.16 
 
As the requirements in terms of qualifications are rather high, but the prestige of those 
positions and their salaries low, it is not an easy task to find a sufficient number of younger 
qualified candidates. Thus, the districts or Street Offices sometimes assign qualified cadres to 
the RCs or Party Committees of a Shequ. 
 
In the Beidakou Shequ (in Shenyang’s Heping district), one male interviewee held 
simultaneous posts as chair person of the RC and of the Party Commitee. Prior to those 
offices he had been a director of a foreign trade company. Although he had formally applied 
for those positions, he was in fact urged to do so by the Party. No qualified candidate for these 
offices had been found in this neighbourhood of 6,200 residents, characterized by high 
unemployment (1,020 persons) and a high ratio of disabled people (152 persons). Conflicts 
between the RC and the residents were frequent. The chair person of the RC noted that he 
often had to ‘keep his cool’, even if he was arbitrarily insulted or criticized. Such insults, he 
pointed out, were not to be taken personally, and were neither directed at him nor at the RC, 
                                                          
14 Interviews, Shenzhen, 20 and 21 February 2004. 
15 Interview, 28 July 2003. 
16 Zhao and Cheng 2002: 290. 
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but actually towards the government. In his view, the residents were only letting off steam. 
Frankly, he explained, he would never accept such a position again and planned to quit after 
the end of his term of office. Many tasks of the government, he noted, were simply transferred 
to the RC without, however, providing the necessary resources for adequately dealing with 
them.  
 
 
6 Attitudes towards elections 
 
As mentioned above, in the Shequs investigated only indirect elections were conducted and 
merely a limited number of delegates could vote. As those delegates were not elected by the 
residents, but rather nominated by the RC, many interviewees declared that they knew little or 
nothing about those elections. It was only in Shenyang that all interviewees were familiar with 
elections. This is not surprising, as 31 among 42 interviewees were delegates who had voted. 
In turn, 27 of 49 persons interviewed in Chongqing (55.1 percent) and 34 of 49 interviewees 
in Shenzhen (69.4 percent) noted that they did not know anything about RC elections. Even 
Party members with a higher level of education vehemently denied that such elections existed 
at all. A lawyer in Shenzhen’s Huaxiajie-Shequ explained, seeing as she herself had never 
heard of such elections, it could in fact be assumed that no one knew anything about them.17  
 
Among the 62 interviewees responding to the question of whether RCs should be elected at 
all, the answers were as follows: 
 
 
Table 2: Should Residents’ Committees be elected? 
 Persons % 
Yes     
No 
No interest/not important 
Elected or not, there is no difference 
Everyone should decide on their own 
 25
5
18
11
3
40.3 
8.1 
29.0 
17.8 
   4.8 
Total 62 100.0 
Source: Own survey. 
 
 
Apparently, people are divided in terms of the significance of elections. Less than half of the 
interviewees responding to this question spoke unreservedly in favour of RC elections. This 
does not reflect a general indifference towards voting. A clear majority declared, furthermore, 
that elections to the People’s Congresses of the district were of primary importance. 
 
A 53-year-old woman in Shenzhen’s Fuhua neighbourhood, trade union boss of a larger 
enterprise, noted: 
 
In fact people are too busy to attend voting. This is the experience I got from my 
company. Less than a quarter will go to the polls if they don’t get a half day off or if 
they couldn’t ask a representative to attend voting in the case they couldn’t go. Many of 
our workers and staff simply do not have the time to go to the polls. [question: What 
about weekends?] To be frank, people are not very interested in voting. If you do not 
                                                          
17 Interview, Shenzhen, 28 February 2004. 
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bring them directly to the ballots, they simply refuse to go. The elections are not related 
to their interests. It is different from other countries where the parliaments are elected 
by the entire population. Here the electoral act is not really sincere, that’s why people 
are not interested in it. People are not familiar with the candidates and they don’t know 
who to elect. They are not very interested in contacts to the Residents Committee.18 
 
Many people had the impression that the work of the RC had nothing to do with their 
everyday lives and personal interests. And what sense do elections make when people do not 
know about them, particularly if one is not interested in the activities of the RC and does not 
see any reason to be. As long as actors are not aware of their interests, their readiness to 
participate appears to be low. 
 
Accordingly, table 2 reveals that less than half of the respondents support elections. 
Interviewees who responded in favour of elections offered the following arguments: they 
increase the sense of responsibility of RC members (12); enhance the standing of the RC 
among residents (7), and raise confidence in relation to the RC (6). Whereas only four 
interviewees favoured elections in Chongqing, seven in Shenyang and 14 in Shenzhen spoke 
in support of elections. 
 
A widespread belief among residents (particularly in Shenzhen) was that candidates were 
actually nominated by the Street Office and that residents merely had the role of giving their 
blessing to the candidates. As mentioned above, many interviewees did not even know 
anything about the elections. Not surprisingly, the interest of the residents in attending those 
elections was low. 
 
A Chinese survey in urban areas revealed the following findings: 
 
 
Table 3: Why are you not interested in attending RC Elections? 
 Persons % 
Elections are a mere formality, only sham 
Elections have nothing to do with me 
Elections are useless 
Elections are a waste of time 
Others 
 634
 147
 131
 112 
51
 59.0 
 13.7 
12.2 
10.4 
4.7 
Total 1075 100.0 
Source: Wang Tiemin 2002: 169. 
 
 
The majority of the interviewees doubted the seriousness of elections. The answer ‘elections 
are a mere formality, only sham’ differs from answers like ‘waste of time’ or ‘useless’. The 
former has to be comprehended as the result of a reflection process. It is grounded in the 
observation that elections are not sincere and that therefore it is useless to attend them.  
 
Accordingly, more than a quarter of the respondents (28.2 percent) did not know whether 
or not ‘their’ candidates had been elected. Two thirds argued that the candidates were 
nominated ‘from above’ and three quarters were unsatisfied with the nomination of 
candidates.19 
                                                          
18 Interview, Shenzhen, 23 February 2004. 
19 Wang Tiemin 2002: 171ff. 
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Our own results demonstrate that in cases where the RC fails to involve residents, the latter 
are more likely to be disinterested in both Shequ activities and RC elections. This is 
particularly true for persons with a higher educational level, cadres, private entrepreneurs, 
residents with jobs outside the neighbourhood and male persons. On the other end of the 
spectrum, the activist category is primarily occupied by elderly women who are jobless, had 
to retire early, or dependent on income support. Participation is frequently connected with 
issues of immediate welfare: many of those who participated more actively had intentions of 
establishing personal connections to the RC in order to improve their chances to obtain such 
support. Furthermore, activists were recruited among women who, after their retirement, still 
looked for a meaningful field of activity, as well as individual and social satisfaction. And 
precisely those groups have the necessary resource at their disposal: sufficient leisure time for 
such activities. 
 
Not surprisingly, latent forms of protest against certain voting procedures can be identified. 
For instance, a female activist in Yongfeng neighbourhood who was not nominated as a 
candidate due to her age nevertheless gained 30 votes. Moreover, numerous electors stated 
having voted for only a single person, as they were not familiar with the other candidates. The 
candidates had neither been introduced to them nor put forth any statements on their working 
program. 
 
Many voters demanded that in the future, candidates should introduce themselves 
personally and substantiate their working program. Whereas in former elections candidates 
were never required to introduce themselves or their working program, this is now not only 
explicitly demanded by the election stipulations, but also makes up a strong demand of the 
constituency. These new demands are thus, concurrently, an outcome of institutional change 
(introduction of semi-competitive elections).20 In most cases, the implementation of elections 
is taken seriously and monitored by higher authorities. This seriousness, along with the 
increasing will of the voters to participate in the nomination of candidates and the practice of 
using secret ballots have, without a doubt, had an impact upon the political awareness of the 
electors. For instance, many residents were well aware that in Shenyang’s Tiexi district an RC 
was removed by the residents due to its inability to solve the crucial issue of water supply. It 
could not be precluded that such events could happen in their own neighbourhoods as well. 
 
A particularity of Shenyang was the argumentation that not elections but rather outstanding 
leaders were decisive for the development of a neighbourhood. Whereas in Shenyang 10 
interviewees responded accordingly, no such answer was given in Chongqing or Shenzhen. In 
the case of Shenyang, the activities of RC leaders were primarily assessed by the residents 
according to the engagement of those leaders in terms of neighbourhood development and 
were not related to elections.21 A female resident of the Yongfeng neighbourhood expressed 
this sentiment as follows: ‘The success of this Shequ is connected to the unconditional 
engagement of Li Jun [the RC’s chairwoman, the author] and not necessarily to elections.’22  
 
Seen from one viewpoint, this argument contains a traditional factor of political culture, 
i.e. the notion that non-elected officials who exercise their power according to the ‘principle 
                                                          
20 Accordingly: Cai Dingjian 2002a: 51–2. 
21 A similar assessment: Wei 2003: 18–19: ‘…in the Chinese social context, non-elected officials tend to enjoy 
more respect than the elected ones, as long as they govern according to the principle of justice…The people have 
no reason to trust anyone who is authorized with the tremendous power of government, whether he or she is 
elected or not.’ 
22 Interview, Shenyang, 3 March 2003. 
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of justice’ acquire greater respect among the people than elected ones who do not.23 From a 
second perspective, this is an expression of a paternalistic experience in the sense that 
‘everything depends on a good leadership’. And, thirdly, this argument reflects that the RC is 
identified with the government or ‘state’. As individuals are not able to impact upon the 
‘state’, they merely hope that their leaders will be qualified persons who shall act in the 
interest of the people. This belief makes it so important for people to have a benevolent leader 
(daitouren) at the top.  
 
Such attitudes are also age-dependent. Elderly people in Shenyang argued that the success 
of a Shequ was dependent on such a daitouren, not on elections. A daitouren was depicted as 
a personal role model, a leader who sets a good example. Younger interviewees disagreed and 
preferred instead improvements in the election system. 
 
Yet, even voting on the part of delegates requires the elected to take the interests of their 
constituents into account. And if the constituents are unsatisfied with the behaviour of RC 
members, those members may not be re-elected. Given that a job in the RC is strongly 
connected to elections and – if re-election fails – new jobs are not easy to find, RC members 
strive to achieve and maintain a positive image among the residents.24  
 
Eventually, elections may serve to reinforce the legitimacy of an RC and its power to 
bargain with higher authorities (like the Street Offices or district governments), as elected 
RCs could argue that they were acting on behalf of the residents or in line with suggestions 
made by their representative delegates. 
 
 
7 Attitudes towards the Mode of Election 
 
Whereas in 2002 merely 99 out of 1,237 RCs in Shenyang were directly elected, no direct 
elections were held in Chongqing and Shenzhen. The majority of the interviewees (ordinary 
residents and RC leaders) argued that the population was too large, the organizational and 
financial efforts required were too extensive and the residents’ interest in elections was too 
low. The head of a Street Office declared: ‘You have to be extraordinary familiar with the 
situation here, otherwise the elections could get out of control’. On the other hand, the 
majority of interviewees did not know the meaning of ‘direct elections’. After this had been 
explained to them, many interviewees noted that, undoubtedly, direct elections were the 
preferable and more democratic mode of voting. 
 
In principle, the current mode of voting is a continuation of previous electoral modes: the 
RC selects, the Street Office monitors, a group of hand-picked people votes. Such voting 
procedures result in low interest in voting. Consequently, the attempt of the party-state to 
involve people in voting processes is destined to fail. 
 
Only a few interviewees questioned the mode of voting itself. Where the interest in voting 
is low, residents declared to be uninterested in a particular mode. And delegates rarely cast 
any doubt upon the mode of election. 
 
                                                          
23 Wei Pan 2003: 18. 
24  Yet, such processes are partially circumvented by Street Offices and district authorities. Interviewees 
frequently complained that RC members who were not re-elected were transferred into other neighbourhoods by 
higher authorities. 
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Here, the general deficiency in information is an issue. The majority of the interviewees 
was not informed that other voting instances beyond indirect voting existed, such as direct 
elections in China’s cities, nor that the central government was voicing its support for direct 
elections. After the meaning of and the difference between direct and indirect elections had 
been explained to them, interviewees responded as follows: 
 
 
Table 4: Which mode of voting would you prefer? 
 Shenyang % Chonqing % Shenzhen %
Direct voting 
Voting by delegates 
Both modes are O.K. 
Elections unnecessary 
Sufficient to elect a leader 
Don’t know 
13
7
13
-
2
7
30.9
16.7
30.9
-
4.8
16.7
16
3
6
1
-
9
45.7
8.6
17.2
2.8
-
25.7
13 
11 
7 
4 
- 
6 
31.7
26.8
17.1
9.8
-
14.6
Total 42 100.0 35 100.0 41 100.0
Source: Own survey. 
 
 
Direct elections were the preferred mode. But many interviewees explained they would prefer 
indirect voting only because the preconditions for direct voting currently remained 
insufficient. 
 
The supporters of direct elections argued that this mode would better represent the 
opinions of the voters and therefore was more democratic. More people would understand the 
work of the RCs and participation would thus increase. Furthermore, in the case of direct 
voting, the RCs would be also more accountable to the residents or electors. Finally, the RCs 
would then represent the will of the residents more explicitly. 
 
Two frequently expressed attitudes could be identified among the supporters of direct 
elections: (1) ‘If I were called upon to vote, I would do so’, i.e. voting as an obligation, and 
(2) ‘Voting is my right’, i.e. voting as a distinct ‘legal right’. The first argument was primarily 
given by people over 50 years old, as well as those with lower educational levels. It represents 
a more passive attitude that might be summed up by the following line of thought: ‘if 
someone asks me to vote, I am on the one hand obliged, on the other hand I am not doing 
anything wrong, because I am not doing so of my own accord. I am merely following a 
command from ‘above’’. The second argument, in turn, was put forward by younger 
interviewees and persons with a higher educational level. Such people comprehended voting 
as a vested right which should be actively exercised. 
 
In Shenzhen, a large portion of the interviewees associated elections with ‘democracy’. A 
sixty-year-old engineer with a university degree argued in terms of direct elections: 
 
This, undoubtedly, is democracy. But we should keep China’s history in mind. Though 
democracy is now a global trend, it does not yet work under the current preconditions in 
China. To establish democracy all at once will not be possible. Several thousand years 
of feudal history till the era of Mao Zedong – to make it like in Western democracies all 
at once – impossible. Look at England or the US, even there the presidents are not 
elected directly. On the other hand, though we have discipline inspection and 
supervision of authorities now, to take reprisals and to take revenge [against persons 
 15
who uncover misdeeds, the author] are widespread. Though illegal, officials play golf or 
privately drive state-owned limousines at the expense of the state. Yet, nobody cares 
about that. What our country is lacking is an effective control of officials.25 
 
What is stated here is that, in principle, the preconditions of an intact democracy or an 
effective election system will have to be created first, i.e. an effective judiciary system and 
legal security in order to curb corruption efficiently. 
 
People supporting direct elections were primarily those with a higher educational level 
and/or a higher cadre’s status: 
 
The Resident’s Committee  m u s t  be elected, and not merely because it is decreed by 
law. By means of elections you become a representative of the masses. You are elected 
and thus legitimized by the residents. Even voting out should be permitted. For instance, 
in another neighbourhood a member of the Resident’s Committee was frequently 
absent. He was, therefore, not re-elected and thus lost his job…Undoubtedly, the current 
elections are not yet democratic. Everything is still under the control of the Street 
Office.26 
 
The vice-director of the Party School in Shenyang’s Dadong district, who concurrently was a 
member of the Consultative Assembly for Public Affairs (cf diagram 1) in the Yongfeng 
neighbourhood, argued for direct elections: 
 
In my opinion, the next elections [of the RC, the author] could be direct ones. The 
preconditions already exist. And we do not need a turnout of one-hundred percent. A 
turnout of 70 percent would be absolutely o.k. Direct elections are important, as indirect 
ones exclude the majority of the population. In future, even the government and the 
People’s Congress of the district and the city should be elected directly. One ought to 
trust the people.27 
 
Supporters of direct elections argued that between 70 and 80 percent of the persons entitled to 
vote would go to the ballots. This argument contradicted the anxiety of some officials that 
elections might turn into a disaster due to high rates of voter abstinence. 
 
Supporters of indirect elections indicated the following causes for their decision: 
 
                                                          
25 Interview, Shenzhen, 24 February 2004. 
26 Interview with the former Party Secretary of a RC in Shenyang, 4 March 2003. 
27 Interview with the vice-director of a district’s Party School, Shenyang, 8 March 2003. 
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Table 5: Why do you oppose direct elections? 
Answer Persons %
1. People don’t know who to elect/don’t know the candidates 
2. Difficult to organize 
3. Low interest of residents/many won’t vote 
4. Creates chaos (luan) 
5. People don’t have time  
6. Lack of awareness among the residents 
7. Lack of necessary premises 
8. Time has not yet come 
9. Too many people involved 
10.Likelihood that people are elected who were not  
nominated by the Street Office 
19 
14 
14 
12 
8 
7 
6 
5 
5 
 
3 
20.4
15.1
15.1
12.9
8.6
7.5
6.4
5.4
5.4
3.2
Total 93 100.0
 
Source: Own survey. 
 
 
The above arguments may be classified in two major categories: (a) subjective items: voters 
are not yet sufficiently prepared for direct voting; and (b) objective items: conditions are not 
yet ripe. Here we may be able to relocate traces of an argument propagated for decades by the 
Party, namely that it was too early to implement democracy. The Party maintained, 
furthermore, that the population was not yet subjectively prepared and that the objective 
conditions (e.g. the low degree of development) would hinder the establishment of a 
democracy. In fact, these arguments reflect distrust towards the population and the anxiety 
that democratic methods could lead to chaos. E.g., people might elect persons other than those 
nominated by the Street Office, or a large group of residents might not vote at all (causing the 
‘leadership’ to run into trouble, facing, for instance, the criticism of higher authorities for 
insufficient preparational work) or that, in a general sense, an situation could occur in which 
the authorities might loose control over a larger crowd of people in an unmanageable 
situation. 
 
A more rational argument, offered particularly by officials, was that direct elections were 
too expensive. Chinese social scientists calculated that the implementation of direct elections, 
for instance in a single Shequ in Peking, would cost about 100,000 yuan.28 These costs cover 
expenses for election propaganda, organizational costs (room rent), remuneration, food and 
gifts for polling assistants, etc. In Chongqing alone, a city with 1,951 Shequs in 2003, about 
195 million yuan would have been necessary for the implementation of direct elections. 
Neither the respective cities nor the neighbourhoods are able to raise such an enormous sum 
of money. 
 
Yet, this economical argument is met with a considerable amount of opposition as well. A 
Chinese survey among various Shequs has shown that costs are high when both the awareness 
of participation is low and neighbourhood networks are weakly developed. The costs are 
significantly lower where the opposite is true. The Chinese research report provides the 
following example (Shequ A: low awareness of participation/weakly evolved networks; Shequ 
B: high awareness/strong networks): 
                                                          
28 According to Professor Li Lulu, director of the Institute of Sociology at the Chinese People’s University, 
Beijing, 11 March 2004. 
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Table 6: Organizational costs of elections in two different Shequs (in yuan) 
Shequ Total  
costs 
Material Propaganda Souvenirs/
gifts 
Remuneration  
of helpers 
Catering Other 
A 80,666.7 26,647.4 14,761 18,484.5 11,500 5771 3512.8 
B 9400 3000 5500 - - 200 700 
Source: Wu Meng 2004: 12. 
 
 
The lower the interest is in participation, the higher the material incentives that are necessary 
for helpers and electors, and vice versa. In fact, it is the belief of officials that people are not 
interested in voting and that, therefore, the organizational costs would by far outstrip the 
benefits. Accordingly, a higher percentage of interviewed officials at the levels of districts, 
Street Offices and RCs supported voting by delegates rather than by ordinary people. 
 
 
Table 7: Which mode of voting do you prefer? (Officials) 
Answers Persons %
Election by delegates 
Direct elections 
No difference between the two 
Others 
22
5
2
1
73.3
16.7
6.7
3.3
Total 30 100.0
 
Source: Own survey. 
 
 
Table 8: Why do you oppose direct elections? (Officials) 
Answers Persons %
1. Low interest among residents/ many won’t vote 
2. Lack of material conditions 
3. Situation could get out of control  
4. Too complicated 
5. Too early 
6. Don’t know  
7. Others 
6 
4 
4 
3 
2 
1 
2 
27.3
18.2
18.2
13.6
9.1
4.5
9.1
Total 22 100.0
 
Source: Own survey. 
 
 
Ranking first among officials is the fear of a low voter turnout. They are well aware of the 
lack of interest in voting among the residents. And they worry that they might be blamed for 
any type of failure or low turnout at the polls. Moreover, officials themselves are not very 
interested in direct elections; they are projected to be little more than troublesome and costly, 
with small potential benefits. 
 
As we have seen, the interviewees assess the issue of voter turnout rather differently. 
Supporters of general and direct elections predict a high turnout, opponents, in contrast, a low 
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one. The New Political Economy has pointed out that people do not attend elections if the 
benefits from participation are lower than the costs.29 In this case, the time required for 
voting, the electoral act itself, or the encounter with officials may all be counted as costs. 
 
According to our results, the residents currently assess the significance of elections to be 
relatively low, as the candidates were nominated by the Street Offices and only selected 
delegates voted for them. In this way, voting provides individuals with little impact on 
decision-making. Hence, the residents perceive the (low) costs of participation to be still 
higher than the benefits. 
 
As mentioned above, the fears of local officials include a low voter turnout. Yet, ‘low’ 
must be seen in relative terms. Officials classify a turnout of less that 80 to 90 percent as 
‘low’. This has to be seen vis-à-vis the fact that due to compulsory voting, elections to the 
People’s Congresses in urban districts have a turnout of more than 90 percent. Therefore, 
higher echelons, officials argue, might expect and demand similar turnouts for RC elections. 
 
On the whole, RC elections are a new phenomenon, a work still in progress. Regularly held 
elections will foster a learning process, the internalization and training of voting, and 
participation. On the one hand, this will enhance the citizens’ demand for information and 
participation; on the other hand, candidates are increasingly forced to present themselves in a 
more substantial way in order to generate trust and secure their election or re-election. The 
introduction of direct elections would therefore be instrumental in creating trust and 
legitimacy. 
 
China’s political leadership is quite aware of this. And that is why it increasingly supports 
the establishment of direct elections. The Party’s newspaper, Renmin Ribao, pointed out that 
in the case of indirect elections the Street Offices in fact nominate the candidates. This would 
negatively affect the identification of residents with their Shequ. Direct elections, as Renmin 
Ribao says, foster participation and this, in turn, is said to be a prerequisite for self-
administration by the residents. Grassroots democracy makes the citizens decide on their own 
affairs. Direct elections would therefore contribute to the generation of a democratic 
consciousness, democratic capabilities and democratic habits of citizens.30  
 
Indirect elections do not meet with the approval of the residents. Moreover, they are 
detrimental to the prestige of elections and of the RCs. As the residents do not have much 
impact upon the selection of candidates, their interest in voting is low. Furthermore, the 
residents gained the impression that the authorities are not interested in the real participation 
of the people. One could therefore argue that indirect elections constitute a sort of institutional 
distrust, since the authorities are well aware that the voters’ turnout would be low and 
therefore could have repercussions on the legitimacy of the regime. 
 
 Currently, the central government is working to popularize direct elections at the local 
level throughout the country. But there is a strong resistance against these efforts among 
urban authorities. The latter worry they might lose control over electors and candidates, 
resulting in a reinforcement of cleavages and conflicts between the population and the local 
authorities. 
 
                                                          
29 Kirsch 1997: 225. 
30 Pan Yao 2004. 
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Undoubtedly, direct elections would enhance the RCs’ legitimacy, albeit the voter turnout 
might be low as long as the constituency does not perceive the RCs as organizations 
representing their own interests, as well as those of their neighbourhood. 
 
Certainly, indirect RC elections have an impact on voting delegates. But as long as they are 
loyal to the RC and their loyalty is not placed in doubt on the grounds of misconduct or 
general ineffectiveness of the RC, and as long as the residents do not pressure the voting 
delegates to champion their interests, the effects of elections may be limited. The Street 
Offices are still monitoring the RCs, not the residents. Nonetheless, as noted in the foregoing 
sections of this paper, there are cases in which RCs were successfully removed by the 
residents after the committees had proven to be unable to solve urgent problems. 
 
 
8 Electoral effects 
 
According to the 1997 Carter Center’s Field Report, village electoral processes were 
significant for three reasons: (a) the election law defines the basic norms of a democratic 
process: secret, direct and competitive ballots; (b) each election period enhances and expands 
the technical capabilities for holding elections; (c) the openness of the government in terms of 
opinion exchanges with experts of the Carter Center proves that the former is significantly 
interested in electoral processes.31 Essentially, this also true for urban elections, even if they 
are still getting off the ground. International comparative research reveals that increased 
competition in elections goes hand in hand with an increase in the number of politically 
interested people and thus of voters.32 Hence, the introduction of direct elections in urban 
areas could function as a catalyst to increase participation. 
 
The enhancement of political participation and politically active citizens are crucial 
features of political modernization. Even if Shequ elections are still a form of mobilized (and 
not autonomous) voting, it would be wrong to categorically deny the participative character of 
such elections. The party-state does determine the selection of candidates and – in the case of 
indirect elections – the composition of the electoral bodies. Nevertheless, behaviour resulting 
from mobilized patterns of political participation (for instance the right to vote), the right of 
elections in accordance with the regulations, and the possibility of voting out officials may be 
internalized and eventually lead to more autonomous patterns of participation. Furthermore, 
mobilizing forms of elections create opportunities for electors, for instance by placing certain 
requirements on candidates or requiring an account of their work at the end of a year. Thus, 
electors can impose restrictions on and monitor the candidates (by means of rendering of 
account or meeting obligations in regards to the voters in order to be re-elected).33  
 
The economic theory of democracy assumes that electors behave rationally by voting for 
those candidates who, they presume will bring them more benefits than others in the future.34 
That is why in present-day China, candidates or elected officials have to act in a certain way 
on behalf of the interests of their constituents so as to be elected or re-elected. 
 
Therefore, the simplistic argument, which states that elections were merely an instrument 
of legitimizing authoritarian structures or monitoring people, does not hold water. Instead, 
                                                          
31 The Carter Center, The Carter Center Delegation to Observe Village Elections in China, March 4–16, 1997: 
12, op. cit.: Suisheng Zhao 2003: 342. 
32 Cf Verba and Nie 1972 and Verba, Nie and Kim 1978. 
33 On the difference between mobilized and autonomous forms of participation, see Huntington and Nelson 
1976: 7–10. 
34 Downs 1957. 
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they exhibit a more ambiguous character. In contrast to indirect elections, direct ones concede 
a certain degree of participation to the population, even if this participation takes a mobilized 
form.35  
 
Residents have the opportunity to participate in the selection of candidates and to discuss 
their respective programs. This enhances the articulation of common interests, the nomination 
of candidates who will act on behalf of the demands and interests of the residents and the 
election of people capable of bargaining successfully with the Street Office or the district 
government in order to realize those interests. 
 
The appeal to conduct ‘democratic elections’ may encourage people to make their own 
demands and work to achieve their shared interests. Moreover, the common accomplishment 
of even minor demands (e.g. those related to the improvement or maintenance of housing 
conditions or infrastructure) reinforces the sense of efficacy of the residents. This, in turn, 
fosters the will to participate and a common sense of community. 
 
The majority of the interviewees who were electoral delegates declared that the content of 
the following statements had positive effects on elections: 
 
• Elected persons have a stronger sense of accountability, because they were elected and 
wanted to be re-elected. 
• People who do not show any engagement for the demands or interests of the residents will 
not be re-elected. 
• Residents increasingly put forward suggestions and voice their opinion. 
 
 
Making suggestions and expressing opinions are salient indicators of participation. Our 
interviews revealed that a certain percentage of the interviewees declared to have raised 
suggestions or voiced opinions: 
 
 
Table 9: Did you raise suggestions or express opinions towards the Residents 
Committee? 
 Shenyang % Chonqing % Shenzhen %
Yes 
No 
15 
14 
51.7
48.3
7
9
43.75
56.25
6 
9 
40.0
60.0
Total 29 100.0 16 100.0 15 100.0
 
Source: Own survey. 
Note: Refers to interviewees who responded to this question. 
 
 
Almost half of the respondents conceded that they had occasionally offered suggestions or 
expressed their opinions during RC meetings. Not surprisingly, the suggestions were 
predominantly concerned with matters of everyday life in the neighbourhood: complaints 
about deficiencies in public security or cleanliness, noise produced by street traders or 
                                                          
35 Certain historical similarities may be identified. For instance, in the first provincial elections in China in early 
20th century, only specially invited persons were admitted to vote. The majority of the population was excluded. 
At the 1909–11 elections, only 1.7 million out of the 400 million people were entitled to vote, cf Fincher 1981 
and Thompson 1995. 
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craftsmen, the increasing number of dogs, arbitrarily parked bicycles, cars driving too quickly 
within the neighbourhood, etc. 
 
Predominantly residents with more prominent positions (veteran Party members, officials 
of the district authorities, larger entrepreneurs, etc.) made suggestions concerning the 
development of the Shequ as such or even articulated substantial criticism. In Shenzhen, for 
instance, we interviewed an 86-year-old Party veteran who told us that he had criticized the 
director of the general office of the district government during a meeting, charging him with 
having requested the residents to express their opinions, but in the end ignoring their 
suggestions. The district government and Street Office, he argued, were making decisions 
without taking the opinions and suggestions of the people living in the neighbourhood into 
consideration.36 
 
Our survey did not reveal any correlation between elections and an increase in suggestions 
or opinions. Such a correlation existed rather in the minds of many interviewees. The 
participation in the electoral body as a supervisory instance of the RC gave those interviewed 
the idea of being able to offer more suggestions and opinions. They received, therefore, the 
(fictitious) impression that more and more suggestions had been put forward. 
 
Without a doubt, the introduction of direct elections will reinforce the power of the Shequ 
vis-à-vis the state. And the Party’s assertion that elections were democratic could be utilized 
by the population to enhance its social space. Such an enhancement could, in turn, occur by 
nominating non-Party candidates or candidates who stand for the common demands and 
interests of the residents and their neighbourhood. Hence, participation could be 
comprehended as a learning process and as a crucial element in political socialization. Modes 
and patterns of participation must be ‘learned’ as a precondition for participating in matters of 
one’s own neighbourhood. And participation requires mind-expanding information in order to 
build awareness and civil capacity. Moreover, it requires organizational capacity in order to 
prevent that participation remains merely a matter of officials. Subjective and organizational 
capacities (or efficacy) make up two central pillars of participation which will have to be 
learned in the Shequ and in apparently non-political social spheres.37  
 
 
9 Why elections? 
 
Why then did the Party permit elections? 
 
First, participation does not pose a challenge to the rule of the Party. The political 
leadership does not comprehend the RCs as a parallel power structure. The Party branches or 
committees in the Shequs are still the dominant and decisive organizations within the 
neighbourhoods. Secondly, the neighbourhoods are monitored by higher echelons of the 
government and Party. In the case of ‘deviance’ the latter may intervene, for example by 
means of a transfer of new officials into the Shequs. 
 
Karklins discerns three patterns explaining why authoritarian regimes conduct elections: 
(a) in the interest of the legitimization of a regime; (b) in order to socialize the masses 
politically; (c) in order to mobilize the population.38 A fourth pattern could be identified as 
‘integration’ based on equality and equal rights within a community (a Shequ), i.e. the 
                                                          
36 Interview, Chongqing, 30 July 2003. 
37 For further information: Kißler 1980. 
38 Karklins 1986: 449; Rose and Mossawir 1967. 
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integrating of Party members and non-Party members, of officials and non-officials, as well as 
of various social strata. 
 
At the same time, elections are a sign of a political relaxation, and they can provide 
information on discontent and opposition among residents. In addition, they foster the 
removal of incompetent and unpopular officials, thus constituting a corrective of power. They 
are, therefore, a stimulus for officials to behave and act in the interest of the voters. In this 
way they contribute to regime legitimacy and regime stability. Elections, finally, can serve to 
make a political system more receptive to new influences.39 
 
The foregoing features of elections are, without question, critical, as they justify the 
legitimacy of a regime and possess a psychological function: elections contain the symbolic 
message for the population that there is no alternative to the rule of the Party and that 
participation will be confined to institutionalized channels only. ‘Participation in the great 
charade of totalitarian and authoritarian elections’, writes Karklins, ‘is highly valued by the 
regime, because the act of each citizen in being part and parcel of it is a small, but significant 
politico-psychological victory.’40 
 
In election theory, electoral processes are discerned as opportunities for citizens to have an 
impact on political leaders. Elections foster support for a political regime. Theories of 
democracy have proven that a correlation exists between voter turnout and regime legitimacy. 
Fair and regular elections create a sense of trust and efficacy and therefore of regime 
legitimacy.41 That is why the Chinese leadership strives to learn from electoral processes in 
‘Western’ countries: it intends to increase state capacity, legitimacy, and governance.42 
 
Elections do not necessarily represent a challenge to the Party’s political monopoly. 
General, competitive elections could rather reinforce good governance in a way that elected 
candidates are more strongly held to the interests of the electorate in order to guarantee their 
re-election. 
 
Legitimacy is primarily grounded in a government’s or officials’ performance in terms of 
various policy-related arenas as well as the pursuance of national goals and interests (such as 
nation-building and working to create a "strong" global power). The party-state is currently 
attempting to increase legitimacy in urban areas by stabilizing the urban grassroots units 
(neighbourhood communities), as well as providing reinforcement in the areas of social 
security, welfare and public security. Further measures aim at creating a solid living 
environment. In March 2005, People’s Daily noted that a "serving government" (fuwuxing 
zhengfu) was crucial in generating and maintaining people’s satisfaction with the 
government.43 These tasks fall under the jurisdiction of the Shequs, i.e. the locations where 
people experience first-hand the fulfilment of such measures.44 
 
Our survey revealed that different social groups develop different notions and criteria in 
terms of legitimacy. Currently, elections play a minor role. Only states which succeed in 
protecting their citizens against social insecurities and risks are successful in acquiring 
                                                          
39 Cf Nohlen 2000: 32. 
40 Karklins ibid.: 465; see also Pravda 1978 and Reshetar 1989: 193ff. 
41 Compare, for instance, Banducci and Karp 2003. 
42 Cf Heberer 2003. 
43 See Xu Rongkai 2005. Cf also the contribution of Wen, Feng, Cao and Cao 2005 on the functional change of 
the state from administrator to service provider. 
44 Ibid. The article argues that the government has to pay attention to adaptation and change capacity. The latter 
constitutes a crucial feature of our concept of stability. 
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legitimacy. Such insecurities and risks concern both socially weak and socially strong people. 
State income support supports the socially weak, but simultaneously reassures better-off 
citizens that they would be able to count on the state’s support in the case of need. This 
produces a feeling of subjective social security. The RCs make great efforts to become 
carriers of legitimacy. If they succeed, legitimacy will become more visible for citizens and 
will trickle down from the central to the local and sub-local levels. 
 
 
10 Conclusion 
 
 
As Huntington has noted, participation assumes a more spontaneous character in a phase of 
adaptation or social change, whereas electoral participation becomes more and more salient in 
order to involve people in controlled processes of participation.45 Locally, social control will 
contribute to impact upon the behaviour of officials and to give the people the impression of 
efficient participation. This is entirely in the interest of eventually improving both governance 
and enhancing regime legitimacy. 
 
Therefore, elections are an expression of the intention of the political leadership to enhance 
patterns of controlled participation. To reach its modernizational goals, the party-state needs 
participation and initiative stemming from the population. Since the commencement of 
economic reforms, the party-state has increasingly withdrawn from more and more spheres of 
societal (social) life. This, for instance, is the case both in the field of economics (decrease of 
the state- and collective-owned economy compared to the private sector), and in residential 
areas (dissolution of the danwei-type residential areas; conversion of public living space into 
private property). Increasingly, more and more social spheres (environment, hygiene, 
administration of residential areas, social welfare) are gradually to be handed over to the 
neighbourhoods. Yet, as for decades the patriarchal socialist state was responsible for all those 
issues, the degree of participation among the population is still rather low. 
 
The function of elections is based on generating legitimacy and improving the efficiency of 
governmental action., Direct elections undoubtedly support these goals. Urban citizens tend to 
prioritize social security over participation and volunteering. This is the reason why urbanites 
are currently neither very interested nor well informed about elections. They do not consider 
ballots very important. Social security and the improvement of one’s living standard remain 
crucial. 
 
Certainly, the enhancement of participation and elections are prominent features of both 
political modernization and democratization. It may be too early to implement 
democratization, as the material preconditions in China are still insufficient. Without 
economic security, elections and participation might not become crucial elements in the minds 
of Chinese people. As long as people are primarily concerned with solving their urgent social 
problems and their daily survival, political participation and elections may only play a minor 
role for individuals. Similarly, Pei Minxin noted that opinion polls would still reveal that the 
majority of the population prefers economic development to political democracy.46 
 
 
                                                          
45 Huntington 1970: 38. 
46 Compare Pei 1997; similarly: Dowd, Carlson and Shen 2000 and Nathan and Shi 1993. 
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Appendix 
 
This article is based on extensive field research conducted in 2003 and 2004. Urban research 
was carried out in cooperation with the Institute of Sociology of the Chinese People's 
University, and was sponsored by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research 
Association). Field research was conducted in six Shequs in three cities (Shenyang, 
Chongqing, and Shenzhen). 
 
Interviews based on qualitative techniques were carried out, for which a series of semi-
standardized, open-ended questions were prepared. In total, 140 residents and 38 officials (on 
the level of urban districts, Street Offices and RCs) were interviewed, and statistical data and 
written material was obtained from Party and government documents and publications. 
 
84 of the resident interviewees were female (60 percent), 56 male (40 percent). 31.4 
percent were over 55 years old, 42.1 percent between 36 and 55 years of age. The share of 
people under 35 (26.5 percent) was relatively low. Due to their occupational duties, the latter 
were rarely at home. Our interviews further revealed that younger people were in large part 
unfamiliar with the situation in their neighbourhoods and, as a rule, did not participate in any 
activities there as long as they were not unemployed. Therefore, they had only very limited 
knowledge about Shequ activities. 
 
The RCs that aided us in organizing the interviews endeavoured to arrange a representative 
selection of interview partners. We were thus provided with the opportunity to interview drug 
addicts, prostitutes, and persons who had previously been charged on criminal convictions. 
 
One crucial problem we faced was that people with daytime working hours were largely 
unavailable, returning only late at night. Although we even conducted interviews in the 
evening and on weekends, the number of interviewees that were currently employed was 
somewhat limited. On the other hand, interviews with this group (entrepreneurs, self-
employed, managers, etc.) revealed only slight differences in opinions.  
 
During the daytime, predominantly elderly and jobless people were available. Those 
interviews enabled us to gain important insights regarding the living conditions of the urban 
poor, especially as many of the interviewees were members of poor households that received 
state income support. 
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